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It	   is	   now	  widely	   recognized	   that	   regulatory	   failures	   have	   contributed	   to	   the	  onset	   of	   the	   global	  
financial	  crisis.	  (1)	  Redressing	  these	  failures	  has	  thus	  been	  a	  key	  policy	  priority	  since	  the	  onset	  of	  
the	  crisis	  at	  both	  the	  domestic	  and	   international	   levels.	   	  The	  regulatory	  reforms	   launched	   in	  the	  
aftermath	   of	   the	   crisis	   call	   upon	   the	   scholarly	   community	   to	   assess	   the	   causes	   of	   regulatory	  
failures	  and	  to	  examine	  resulting	  change	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  finance	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  orthodoxy	  
that	  underpins	  it	  and	  the	  modalities	  in	  which	  the	  transition	  is	  taking	  place	  (Coen	  &	  Roberts	  2012).	  	  
	  
The	  articles	  in	  this	  special	  issue	  take	  up	  these	  research	  challenges	  by	  investigating	  the	  factors	  that	  
help	  explain	  variations	  in	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  regulatory	  processes	  and	  thus	  shedding	  light	  on	  an	  often	  
understudied	   aspect	   in	   the	   regulation	   literature:	   the	   pattern	   of	   regulatory	   change.	   	   Established	  
studies	   have	   provided	   many	   and	   important	   insights	   on	   the	   specific	   mechanisms	   that	   drive	  
regulatory	   change,	   from	   market	   structures	   to	   domestic	   institutions	   and	   regulatory	   ideas	  
(Braithwaite	  2008;	  Braithwaite	  &	  Drahos	  2000;	  Cohen	  &	  Héritier	  2005;	  Jabko	  2004;	  Levi-­‐Faur	  2005;	  
Thatcher	  &	  Coen	  2008;	  Vogel	  1996).	  They	  have	  also	  focused	  on	  the	  actors	  and	  the	  resources	  used	  
in	  shaping	  regulatory	  policies	  (Héritier,	  Knill	  &	  Mingers	  1996;	  Knill	  &	  Lenschow	  2000;	  Posner	  2009).	  
In	   contrast,	   the	   variety	   in	   the	   dynamics	   of	   regulatory	   change(s)	   has	   not	   been	   studied	  
systematically	   and	   therefore	   its	   nature,	   causes,	   and	   sources	   remain	   somewhat	   obscure.	   The	  
purpose	   of	   this	   special	   issue	   is	   to	   fill	   this	   gap	   by	   focusing	   on	   the	   different	   dynamics	   of	   the	  
regulatory	  process	  in	  the	  issue	  area	  of	  finance	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis.	  	  
	  
In	  particular,	  the	  empirical	  cases	  that	  follow	  examine	  different	  dynamics	  of	  regulatory	  change	  and	  
explain	   them	   in	   light	   of	   the	   interaction	   between	   institutional	   factors	   and	   the	   activity	   of	   change	  
agents	  and	  veto	  players	  involved	  in	  the	  regulatory	  reform	  process.	  The	  institutional	  factors,	  which	  
are	   explained	   at	   greater	   length	   below,	   relate	   to:	   	   the	   resources	   that	   change	   agents	   and	   veto	  
players	  possess;	   	   the	  characteristics	  and	  boundaries	  of	   the	   regulatory	  setting;	  and	   	   the	  meaning	  
attributed	   to	   regulatory	   ideas	   and	   the	   degree	   of	   consensus	   surrounding	   them.	   Focusing	   on	   the	  
interaction	  between	  these	  factors	  and	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  actors	  involved	  in	  the	  regulatory	  process,	  
we	  engage	  with	  the	  debate	  on	  agency	  and	  structure,	  and	  on	  macro	  and	  micro	  changes	  in	  the	  study	  
of	  social	  and	  political	   institutions	  (Blyth	  et	  al.	  2011).	  (3)	   Indeed,	  although	  the	  agency	  of	  actors	   is	  
critical	   to	   the	   regulatory	  process,	   in	  particular	   that	  of	   technical	  bureaucracies	   (Vogel	  1996;	  Levi-­‐
Faur	  2006),	   the	  degree	  of	  control	   that	   regulators	  have	  over	   the	  process	  also	  varies	  according	   to	  
several	  institutional	  factors	  (see	  also	  Haines	  2011).	  	  
	  
We	  apply	  these	  insights	  to	  the	  study	  of	  a	  number	  of	  crucial	  cases	  of	  financial	  governance	  including	  
the	   rules	   and	   arrangements	   that	   govern	   financial	   regulation,	   offshore	   financial	   centers	   and	  
shadow	  banking,	  the	  financial	  industry’s	  involvement	  in	  global	  regulatory	  processes,	  and,	  in	  linking	  
up	  to	  the	  real	  economy,	  macroeconomic	  modeling.	  While	  these	  case	  studies	  do	  not	  exhaust	  the	  
regulatory	  reform	  agenda,	  they	  are	  selected	  because	  they	  cover	  important	  or	  contentious	  reforms	  
which	  highlight	  activity	  at	  various	  levels	  of	  governance,	  provide	  a	  contrast	  between	  pre	  and	  post-­‐
crisis	  debates,	  and	  call	  for	  a	  reassessment	  of	  the	  role	  and	  capacity	  of	  private	  actors	  and	  the	  official	  
community.	   Furthermore,	   they	   provide	   a	   comparison	   of	   the	   dynamics	   of	   change	   across	   global	  
finance	  issue	  areas	  while	  going	  beyond	  the	  usual	  banking/securities/insurance	  subsector	  analyses	  
often	   employed	  when	   studying	   financial	   regulation	   (e.g.	   Singer	   2007).	   	   Indeed,	   if	   it	   is	   true	   that	  
capitalism	  varies	  not	  only	  across	  nations	  but	  also	  across	  sectors	  (Levi-­‐Faur	  2006),	  we	  also	  want	  to	  
know	  whether	  significant	  differences	  exist	  among	  these	  subsectors-­‐	  (4)	  	  
	  
The	  special	  issue’s	  approach	  to	  regulatory	  change	  reveals	  three	  overall	  conclusions	  in	  addition	  to	  
many	  specific	  insights.	  First,	  the	  essays	  collectively	  demonstrate	  the	  limits	  of	  explanations	  that	  link	  
regulatory	  developments	   to	  a	   common	   set	  of	   exogenous	   forces	  or	  market	  pressures.	  A	  market-­‐
based	  explanation	  may	  well	  account	  for	  the	  elements	  of	  convergence	  among	  the	  sectors	  that	  have	  
been	   the	   object	   of	   reform.	   For	   instance,	   it	   can	   explain	   the	   common	   rhetoric	   of	   re-­‐regulation	  
adopted	  in	  many	  different	  sectors	  of	  financial	  governance.	  However,	  a	  market-­‐based	  explanation	  
cannot	  address	  the	  most	  remarkable	  variance	  in	  how	  financial	  rules	  and	  arrangements	  have	  been	  
transformed	   since	   the	   start	   of	   the	   crisis.	   Facing	   similar	   challenges,	   government	   officials,	  
technocrats,	   and	   the	   private	   sector	   have	   nevertheless	   responded	   differently	   across	   subsectors.	  
Hence,	  we	   submit,	  what	   explains	   the	   variation	   in	   the	  dynamics	   of	   the	   regulatory	  process	   is	   not	  
exogenous	  but	  endogenous	   to	  the	  subsector	  and	   issue	  area	  that	   is	  the	  object	  of	  transformation.	  
(5)	  	  
	  
Second,	  although	  the	  financial	  sector	  offers	  special	  evidence	  of	  incremental	  over	  rapid	  and	  radical	  
change	  (Moschella	  &	  Tsingou	  2013),	  incremental	  change	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  minor	  change.	  
Rather,	  as	  the	  most	  recent	  literature	  on	  institutional	  change	  has	  amply	  demonstrated	  (Mahoney	  &	  
Thelen	  2010;	  Streeck	  &	  Thelen	  2005),	  a	  slow	  process	  of	  change	  may	  also	  lead	  to	  more	  profound	  
changes	  in	  policy	  outcomes	  ,	  especially	  if	  we	  do	  not	  necessarily	  conflate	  the	  temporal	  dimension	  
of	   change	   with	   the	   substantive	   dimension	   (Baker	   in	   this	   issue).	   Furthermore,	   whereas	   the	  
conventional	  wisdom	  holds	   that	   incremental	   changes	   are	   closely	   associated	  with	   the	   activity	   of	  
veto	  players	  and	  conservative	  societal	  forces	  –	  such	  as	  financial	  industry	  groups	  and	  technocrats	  –	  
the	   evidence	   in	   this	   special	   issue	   suggests	   that	   those	   forces	   that	   usually	   hinder	   change	   are	   not	  
necessarily	  the	  primary	  factor	  that	  slows	  down	  regulatory	  reforms	  (Rixen	  in	  this	  issue).	  This	  means	  
that	   the	   role	   actors	   play	   –	   be	   it	   the	   role	   of	   promoter	   of	   or	   opponent	   to	   change	   –cannot	   be	  
determined	  ex	  ante	  but	  are	  a	  matter	  of	  empirical	  investigation.	  	  
	  
Finally,	   our	   collective	   study	   provides	   some	   insights	   on	   the	   prospects	   for	   global	   financial	  
governance,	  particularly	  in	  light	  of	  its	  pre-­‐crisis	  emphasis	  on	  market	  discipline,	  and	  transnational,	  
technical	  and	  private	  authority	  (Djelic	  &	  Sahlin-­‐Andersson	  2006;	  Graz	  &	  Nölke	  2008).	  The	  crisis	  and	  
the	  reactions	  in	   its	  aftermath,	  marked	  by	  political	  activism	  and	  calls	  for	  re-­‐regulation,	  have	  led	  a	  
number	   of	   commentators	   to	   identify	   a	   general	   reorientation	   in	   the	   philosophy	   that	   underpins	  
global	   financial	   governance	   (Germain	   2010,	   Pagliari	   2012,	   Foot	   &	   Walter	   2011,	   249).	   (6)	   The	  
argument	   is	   that	   the	   pendulum	  has	  moved	   away	   from	  deregulation,	   self-­‐regulation	   and	  market	  
discipline	  to	  a	  more	  assertive	  and	  interventionist	  role	  for	  the	  public	  sector.	  However,	  the	  evidence	  
assembled	  in	  this	  special	  issue	  does	  not	  provide	  clear-­‐cut	  support	  for	  these	  propositions.	  While	  it	  
is	  true	  that	  the	  activity	  and	  competence	  of	  the	  technical	  and	  expert	  policy	  communities	  analyzed	  
in	  the	  case	  studies	  that	  follow	  was	  initially	  discredited,	  their	  grip	  on	  the	  regulatory	  process	  has	  not	  
been	  seriously	  dented	  (Young,	  Henriksen	  in	  this	  issue).	  	  
	  
Before	  proceeding,	  two	  clarifications	  are	   in	  order.	  First,	  the	  articles	   in	  this	  special	   issue	  focus	  on	  
the	  stages	  of	  rules	  formulation,	  negotiation,	  and	  decision.	  (7)	  Considering	  that	  much	  of	  the	  post-­‐
crisis	   global	   regulatory	   and	   economic	   reforms	   are	   ongoing,	   the	   articles	   do	   not	   analyze	   rule	  
implementation,	  monitoring,	  and	  diffusion.	   	   Issues	   related	   to	   implementation,	  however,	   such	  as	  
the	  presence	  of	  necessary	  organizational	  capacity	  and	  networks	  to	  implement	  a	  specific	  regulatory	  
reform,	   loom	  large	  during	  the	  stages	  of	  rule	  formulation,	  negotiation,	  and	  decision	  too	  (cf.	  Bach	  
and	  Newman	  2010):	  	  the	  actors	  involved	  in	  regulatory	  reform	  processes	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  potential	  
obstacles	  that	  a	  specific	  regulation	  may	  encounter	  at	  the	  stage	  of	  formulation	  and	  this	  influences	  
selection	  among	  regulatory	  options	  (Baker	  in	  this	  issue).	  (8)	  	  
	  
Finally,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  study,	  we	  adopt	  a	  broad	  definition	  of	  regulation.	  Under	  the	  rubric	  
of	   “regulation”	   we	   include	   not	   only	   the	   measures	   adopted	   by	   governments	   or	   other	   public	  
regulatory	  authorities	  but	  also	  “all	  mechanisms	  of	   social	   control,”	   including	  both	  state	  and	  non-­‐
state	   processes	   (Jordana	   &	   Levi-­‐Faur	   2004,	   p.	   5;	   also	   Baldwin,	   Scott	   &	   Hood	   1998,	   p.	   4).	   The	  
adoption	  of	   this	   broad	  definition	   reflects	   two	   key	   characteristics	   of	   global	   financial	   governance.	  
The	   first	   is	   the	   role	   of	   private	   authority	   in	   defining	   governance	   rules(Graz	   &	   Nölke	   2008).	  
Specifically,	   the	   private	   sector	   plays	   a	   prominent	   role	   in	   the	   development	   of	   global	   financial	  
regulation	   not	   only	   through	   its	   lobbying	   efforts	   (Johnson	   2009)	   but	   also	   because	   private	   sector	  
associations	   often	   provide	   the	   rules	   or	   help	   public	   sector	   regulators	   in	   the	   formulation	   and	  
implementation	  of	  policies	  (Porter	  2005;	  Tsingou	  2008).	  The	  second	  characteristic	  is	  the	  soft	  and	  
voluntary	  nature	  of	  most	  global	  financial	  rules	  (Helleiner	  &	  Pagliari	  2010,	  p.3).	  	  
	  
	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  we	  introduce	  the	  factors	  that,	  combined	  with	  the	  activity	  of	  change	  actors	  and	  
veto	   players,	   may	   help	   account	   for	   different	   regulatory	   dynamics.	   Finally,	   we	   conclude	   by	  
summarizing	   the	   contributions	   and	   delineating	   their	   implications	   for	   the	   study	   of	   financial	  
governance	  and	  reform.	  	  
	  
2.	  Explaining	  varieties	  of	  regulatory	  change	  
	  
Since	   the	   early	   articulation	   of	   the	   economic	   theory	   of	   regulation	   (Stigler	   1971),	   several	   factors	  
have	  been	  identified	  as	  key	  in	  shaping	  domestic	  regulation,	  including	  market	  forces,	  interest	  group	  
pressures,	  and	  ideologies	  (for	  a	  review,	  see	  Levi-­‐Faur	  2011).	  Some	  scholars	  have	  been	  cautious	  in	  
attributing	   pride	   of	   place	   to	   one	   causal	   factor	   over	   the	   others,	   suggesting	   instead	   that	   some	  
factors	  (market	  failure,	  democratic	  responsiveness	  and	  interest	  group	  pressures)	  together	  explain	  
the	  main	  elements	  of	  a	   regulatory	   regime	   (Hood,	  Rothstein	  &	  Baldwin	  2001).	  Others	  have	  been	  
bolder	   in	   their	  quest	   for	   the	  causal	   factor	  of	   regulation,	  by	  pointing	  out	   to	  mechanisms	   such	  as	  
lesson	  drawing	  (Rose	  1991),	  the	  influence	  and	  support	  of	  international	  organizations	  (Henisz	  et	  al.	  
2005;	  Babb	  2004),	  the	  legacy	  of	  past	  regulation	  (Thatcher	  &	  Coen	  2008),	  domestic	  administrative	  
traditions	  and	  market	   structure	   (Coen	  &	  Héritier	  2005;	  Vogel	  1996)	   and	   regulatory	   ideas	   (Jabko	  
2004).	  Having	  unveiled	  the	  way	  in	  which	  each	  factor	  shapes	  regulatory	  regimes,	  these	  studies	  have	  
provided	   important	   insights	   on	   the	   politics	   of	   regulatory	   change.	   Nevertheless,	   they	   have	   been	  
somewhat	  less	  successful	  in	  explaining	  variation	  in	  the	  pattern	  of	  regulatory	  reform.	  	  
	  
We	  do	  not	  suggest	  that	  existing	  scholarship	  is	  silent	  on	  the	  dynamics	  of	  regulatory	  change.	  On	  the	  
contrary,	  the	  literature	  contributes	  key	  ideas	  for	  exploring	  the	  puzzle	  in	  our	  study.	  For	  instance,	  in	  
his	  work	  on	  regulatory	  reform	  in	  advanced	  economies,	  Steven	  K.	  Vogel	  (1996,	  p.	  23)	  explains	  the	  
degree	  of	  regulatory	  change	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  gap	  between	  goals	  and	  capabilities,	  and	  reads	  the	  
transformation	   in	  UK	   financial	   regulation	   in	   the	   late	  1980s	  as	  an	  example	  of	  quick	  and	  dramatic	  
change	  that	  virtually	  took	  place	  “in	  the	  space	  of	  two	  weeks	  in	  the	  autumn	  of	  1986”	  (Vogel	  1996,	  p.	  
93).	   Likewise,	   Christopher	   Way	   (2005)	   suggests	   that	   the	   speed	   with	   which	   regulatory	   changes	  
occur	   primarily	   depends	   on	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	   reforming	   sector.	   He	   finds	   that	   politically	  
insecure	   leaders	  may	   focus	   on	   domestic	   financial	   market	   reforms	   because	   they	   generate	   long-­‐
term	   risks	   but	   short-­‐term	   benefits.	   Important	   work	   has	   also	   been	   developed	   to	   account	   for	  
different	   types	  of	   regulation	   in	   terms	  of	   stringency	   (Vogel	  1997)	  and	  private	  sector	  organization	  
(Newman	   &	   Bach	   2004).	  We	   do	   find,	   however,	   that	   more	   work	   needs	   to	   be	   done	   in	   order	   to	  
systematically	  assess	  differences	  in	  the	  processes	  of	  regulatory	  change.	  
	  
The	  same	  shortcoming	  affects	  much	  of	   the	  scholarship	  on	   the	   transformation	  of	  global	   financial	  
governance	   and	   the	   rules	   that	   underpin	   it.	   Although	   this	   scholarship	  has	   certainly	   succeeded	   in	  
granting	   the	   study	   of	   global	   finance	   a	   distinctive	   research	   agenda,	   it	   has	   been	   somewhat	   less	  
explicit	   in	   explaining	  what	   causes	   variation	   in	   the	   dynamics	   of	   international	   financial	   regulatory	  
reform.	  The	  literature	  tends	  to	  focusmore	  on	  questions	  of	  who	  shapes	  international	  financial	  rules	  
and	   less	   on	   questions	   of	   how	   to	   account	   for	   differences	   in	   the	   process	   of	   rule-­‐creation	   (for	   a	  
review	  	  see	  Helleiner	  &	  Pagliari	  2011;	  Moschella	  &	  Tsingou	  2013).	  	  
	  
In	   this	   section,	  we	   thus	   advance	   a	   number	   of	   propositions	   that	   encourage	   researchers	   to	   think	  
more	  seriously	  and	  systematically	  about	  differences	   in	   regulatory	  change.	  These	  differences	  can	  
pertain	   to	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   regulatory	   change	   as	   suggested	   by	   Buch-­‐Hansen	   (2012,	   p.	   6)	   who	  
argues	  that	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  distinguish	  between	  shallow	  and	  deep	  regulatory	  changes.	  However,	  
they	  may	  also	  be	  linked	  to	  the	  process	  itself,	  giving	  rise	  to	  different	  regulatory	  dynamics	  that	  can	  
be	  distinguished	  based	  on	  timing	  (quick	  or	  slow).	  	  
	  
In	   order	   to	   account	   for	   variation	   in	   regulatory	   dynamics,	   we	   suggest	   concentrating	   on	   the	  
relationship	   between	   the	   actors	   involved	   in	   the	   regulatory	   process	   and	   the	   institutional	  
constraints	   these	  actors	   face.	   (9)	   In	  particular,	  we	   identify	   two	  distinct	   categories	  of	  actors	   that	  
help	  explain	  processes	  of	  change	  in	  global	  financial	  regulation:	  change	  actors	  and	  veto	  players.	  The	  
identity	   of	   these	   actors,	   we	   submit,	   is	   diverse:	   in	   different	   times	   and	   different	   circumstances,	  
governments,	  societal	  interests,	  or	  transnational	  technocrats	  can	  play	  the	  roles	  of	  change	  agents	  
and	  veto	  players.	  Assigning	  roles	  is	  therefore	  a	  matter	  of	  empirical	  investigation	  and	  is	  not	  defined	  
ex	  ante	  in	  our	  theoretical	  framework.	  
	  
Whereas	   change	   agents	   lead	   the	   process	   of	   change	   by	   being	   explicit	   advocates	   or	   discreet	  
supporters	   of	   specific	   changes,	   veto	   players,	   in	   principle,	   aim	   at	   maintaining	   the	   status	   quo	   in	  
order	   to	   preserve	   their	   privileges	   and	   safeguard	   their	   interests	   or	   those	   of	   their	   constituencies	  
(Héritier,	  Knill	  &	  Mingers	  1996).	  These	  actors	  may	  sustain	  the	  reproduction	  of	  existing	  institutions	  
over	  time,	  vetoing	  or	  opposing	  change	  that	  negatively	  affects	  them	  (Tsebelis	  2000).	  	  Although	  veto	  
players	  generally	  oppose	  change,	  veto	  players	   can	  also	  expressly	  promote	   types	  of	   change.	  This	  
happens	  when	  veto	  players	  realize	  that	  regulatory	  change	  is	  a	  way	  of	  maintaining	  their	  privileged	  
position.	  Similarly	  to	  change	  agents,	  veto	  players	  may	  also	  pursue	  their	  cause	  for	  change	  more	  or	  
less	  explicitly.	  
	  
Moving	  from	  the	  actors	  to	  the	  institutional	  factors	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  dynamics	  of	  regulatory	  
processes,	  we	  can	   identify	   three	   sets	  of	   important	   factors	   in	   the	  governance	  of	  global.	   The	   first	  
cluster	   of	   factors	   focuses	   on	   the	   resources	   that	   change	   agents	   and	   veto	   players	   possess	   to	  
influence	   the	   regulatory	   process,	   including	   information	   and	   expertise,	   organizational	   capacity,	  
financial	   resources	   (Black	  2010,	  p.	  15)	  and	  even	  prestige	  and	  “esteem”	   (Baker	   in	   this	   issue).	  For	  
instance,	  when	  technical	  knowledge	  on	  a	  specific	  regulatory	  issue	  is	  not	  well-­‐developed	  or	  when	  
organizational	   capacity	   to	   implement	  a	   specific	   regulatory	  decision	   is	  poor	  or	  absent,	   regulatory	  
reform	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  follow	  a	  slow	  and	  incremental	  process.	  The	  opposite	  is	  likely	  to	  take	  place	  
when	  regulators	  possess	  analytical	  purchase	  and	  implementation	  capacity.	  	  
	  
Change	   actors	   and	   veto	   players	   also	   face	   a	   series	   of	   factors	   related	   to	   the	   characteristics	   and	  
boundaries	   of	   the	   regulatory	   settings.	   These	   include	   both	   the	   number	   of	   actors	   involved	   in	   the	  
regulatory	   process	   and	   the	   distribution	   of	   power	   among	   them.	   Indeed,	   regulatory	   sectors	   with	  
numerous	  relevant	  actors	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  follow	  slower	  dynamics	  of	  change	  than	  is	  the	  case	  in	  
sector	  with	  a	  more	  limited	  number	  of	  actors	  (c.f.	  Tsebelis	  2000,	  p.	  464).	  This	  hypothesis	  speaks	  to	  
the	   problem	   of	   collective	   action	   (Olson	   1965).	   Indeed,	   the	   dynamic	   of	   regulation	   may	   be	  
hampered	   by	   the	   difficulties	   of	   forging	   collective	   action	   among	   the	   actors	   involved	   in	   the	  
regulatory	   process,	   especially	   when	   competition	   issues	   are	   at	   stake	   (Rixen	   in	   this	   issue).	   The	  
distribution	  of	  authority	  among	  institutions	  and	  potential	  turf	  fights	  over	  influence	  can	  also	  affect	  
the	   process	   of	   regulatory	   reform.	   So	   can	   the	   distribution	   of	   power	   among	   the	   actors	   more	  
generally,	  especially	  in	  state-­‐based	  analyses	  (c.f.	  Drezner	  2007,	  28).	  The	  expectation	  is	  that	  when	  
financial	  power	  is	  concentrated	  among	  a	  few	  states,	  they	  may	  exercise	  veto	  power	  and	  slow	  down	  
the	  process	  of	  change	  (10).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  change	  agents	  are	  unlikely	  to	  support	  reforms	  that	  
significantly	  depart	  from	  great	  powers’	  existing	  rules	  and	  practices,	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  the	  potential	  of	  
a	  veto	  action.	  	  
	  
The	  third	  set	  of	  factors	  investigated	  in	  the	  articles	  of	  this	  special	  issue	  relate	  to	  the	  role	  of	  ideas	  in	  
influencing	  the	  pattern	  of	  regulatory	  dynamics.	  It	  is	  widely	  recognized	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  ideas	  
and	  their	  content	  may	  slow	  down	  or	  speed	  up	  regulatory	  transformations	  (c.f.	  Vogel	  1996,	  p.	  264).	  
The	   consensus	  around	   specific	  normative	   frameworks	   is	   also	  a	   key	   factor	  explaining	  patterns	  of	  
financial	  and	  macroeconomic	  cooperation	  (McNamara	  1998),	  the	  expectation	  is	  that	  the	  stronger	  
the	   consensus,	   the	   more	   substantive	   the	   regulatory	   change	   will	   be	   (Baker	   in	   this	   issue).	  
Furthermore,	   ideational	   changes	   may	   contribute	   to	   alter	   the	   policy-­‐making	   context	   and,	  
consequently,	   the	   social	   groups	   that	   mobilize	   (Young	   in	   this	   issue).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  
institutionalization	   of	   certain	   economic	   ideas,	   may	   also	   delineate	   the	   parameters	   of	   potential	  
change	  (Henriksen	  in	  this	  issue).	  
	  
In	  the	  essays	  that	  follow,	  contributors	  examine	  the	  interaction	  of	  actors	  (change	  agents	  and	  veto	  
players)	  with	   one	   or	  more	   of	   the	   constraining	   factors	   identified	   above.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   note,	  
however,	   that	   these	   propositions	   are	   probabilistic	   rather	   than	   deterministic	   in	   nature:	   they	  
suggest	  that	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  specific	  dynamic	  of	  regulatory	  change	  increases	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  
certain	  institutional	  factors,	  but	  not	  that	  regulatory	  dynamics	  will	  always	  be	  the	  same	  when	  these	  
factors	  are	  present.	  
	  
	  3.	  Conclusions	  
	  
While	  it	  is	  too	  early	  to	  assess	  the	  ultimate	  outcome	  of	  the	  regulatory	  drive	  prompted	  by	  the	  crisis	  
and	   its	  effects,	   the	  reform	  process	   thus	   far	  already	  offers	  a	   laboratory	   for	  scholars	   interested	   in	  
regulation.	  Specifically,	  the	  global	  financial	  regulatory	  reform	  process	  has	  brought	  to	  the	  surface	  
an	   interesting	   puzzle	   that	   is	   too	   often	   implicitly	   rather	   than	   explicitly	   addressed	   in	   studies	   of	  
regulatory	  regimes:	  the	  variation	  in	  the	  dynamics	  of	  regulatory	  change.	  
	  
The	  theoretical	  propositions	  developed	  in	  the	  preceding	  section	  aim	  to	  suggest	  ways	  in	  which	  to	  
understand	  variations.	  While	  we	  do	  not	  claim	  that	  they	  can	  systematically	  account	  for	  all	  specific	  
dynamics	   of	   regulatory	   change,	   we	   nonetheless	   identify	   them	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   developing	   a	  
research	  agenda	  that	  encourages	  serious	  thinking	  about	  variation	  in	  regulatory	  change:	  how	  and	  
why	   change	   can	   at	   times	   be	   quick	   and	   dramatic	   and	   in	   other	   times	   and	   other	   contexts,	   slow,	  
gradual	  and	  incremental.	  	  
	  
In	  doing	  so,	  our	  study	  sets	  out	  to	  make	  two	  broad	  contributions	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  regulation	  and	  
regulatory	   change.	   First,	   it	   complements	  existing	   studies	  and	  approaches	  by	  alerting	   scholars	   to	  
the	   variation	   in	   regulatory	   dynamics.	   Second,	   we	   aim	   to	   provide	   a	   systematic,	   comparative	  
analysis	  of	  regulatory	  changes	  in	  global	  financial	  regulation	  that	  can	  usefully	  complement	  studies	  
on	  domestic	   financial	   regulation.	  This	   is	  especially	  pertinent	  as	   the	   financial	   sector	  provides	  not	  
only	  a	   textbook	   instance	  of	   the	  globalization	  of	   regulation	   (Braithwaite	  &	  Drahos	  2000,	  pp.	  103-­‐
104)	   but	   is	   also	   a	   sector	   where	   technical	   bureaucracies	   play	   a	   key	   role	   in	   line	   with	   	   most	  	  
regulatory	  cases	  studied	  (Vogel	  1996,	  1997;	  Levi-­‐Faur	  2006).	  	  
	  
In	  the	  first	  article	  of	  this	  issue,	  Andrew	  Baker	  examines	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  change	  that	  is	  taking	  place	  
in	   financial	   regulatory	   circles	   with	   the	   adoption	   of	   principles	   of	   macroprudential	   policy.	   He	  
demonstrates	   that	   even	   actors	   that	   are	   traditionally	   understood	   and	   treated	   in	   analyses	   as	  
preventing	   change	   (transnational	   bureaucracies)	   act	   instead	   as	   change	   agents.	   The	   rapid	   and	  
radical	   transformation	   that	   Baker	   recounts	   in	   the	   empirical	   analysis	   can	   be	   explained	   by	   the	  
resources	   these	   change	   actors	   possess,	   especially	   their	   expertise	   and	   reputation.	   Their	   central	  
position	  in	  the	  regulatory	  network	  is	  another	  crucial	  explanatory	  factor	  for	  the	  speedy	  adoption	  of	  
a	   macroprudential	   agenda.	   In	   turn,	   the	   lack	   of	   specific	   practical	   ideas	   on	   macroprudential	  
regulation	  explains	  the	  incremental	  pattern	  of	  regulatory	  change.	  
	  
The	  next	  article	  by	  Thomas	  Rixen	  investigates	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  changes	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  the	  
regulation	   of	   offshore	   centers	   and	   the	   shadow	   banking	   sector.	   Rixen	   identifies	   a	   pattern	   of	  
incremental	   regulatory	   dynamics	   that	   is	   largely	   the	   result	   of	   the	   key	   characteristics	   of	   the	  
regulatory	   context.	   Faced	   with	   jurisdictional	   competition	   on	   the	   one	   the	   hand,	   and	   domestic	  
societal	  pressures	  on	  the	  other,	  governments	  have	  failed	  to	  develop	  a	  common	  position	  in	  favor	  of	  
radical	   regulation.	   Rixen	   advances	   the	   arguments	   by	   examining	   the	   formation	   of	   regulatory	  
preferences	   in	   some	   of	   the	   most	   important	   financial	   jurisdictions,	   the	   USA,	   UK,	   Germany	   and	  
France.	  	  
	  
The	  next	   contribution	  by	   Kevin	   Young	   investigates	   the	   role	   of	   private	   sector	   actors	   in	   the	   post-­‐
crisis	   financial	   governance	   reforms.	   Specifically,	   Young	   examines	   how	   private	   financial	   industry	  
groups	  have	  adapted	  to	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  regulatory	  environment	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  associability	  and	  
advocacy	  strategies.	  Although	  the	  crisis	  has	  contributed	  to	  weaken	  the	  private	  sector’s	  veto	  power	  
as	  compared	  to	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  period,	  the	  article	  finds	  that	  the	  evolving	  regulatory	  environment	  has	  
forced	  private	  sector	  groups	  to	  adapt	  and	  change	  by	  forming	  new	  alliances	  in	  order	  to	  overcome	  
rhetoric	  on	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  finance	  on	  the	  real	  economy	  These	  new	  strategies	  explain	  the	  
incremental	   nature	   of	   change	   as	   the	   focus	   has	   been	   on	   embracing	   reforms	   that	   maintain	   a	  
privileged	  role	  for	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  	  affect	  the	  process	  by	  influencing	  the	  pace	  and	  timing	  of	  
implementation.	  
	  
The	   last	   article	   by	   Lasse	   Folke	   Henriksen	   moves	   the	   attention	   to	   the	   links	   between	   financial	  
governance	   and	   the	   real	   economy	   and	   investigates	   the	   evolution	   of	  macroeconomic	   policy	   in	   a	  
domestic	  setting.	  Specifically,	  Henriksen	  examines	  the	  cumulative	  incremental	  changes	  that	  have	  
taken	   place	   in	   macroeconomic	   modeling	   in	   Denmark	   leading	   to	   major	   changes	   through	  
progressive	  adjustments	   to	  macroeconomic	  modeling.	  Explaining	   the	  pattern	  of	   incrementalism,	  
Henriksen	  draws	   attention	   to	   small	   changes	   that	   lead	   to	   profound	   transformations	   and	   in	   turn,	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Notes	  
1 The	  literature	  on	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  crisis	  is	  vast	  and	  any	  overview	  is	  inevitably	  selective.	  Among	  the	  analyses	  
conducted	  by	  international	  supervisory	  bodies	  and	  panels	  of	  international	  experts	  see	  Bank	  for	  International	  
Settlements	  (2008),	  de	  Larosière	  (2009),	  Financial	  Services	  Authority	  (2009)	  and	  IMF	  (2009).	  
2 For	  an	  overview	  of	  what	  has	  been	  achieved	   in	   the	  reform	  of	   the	  global	   financial	   system	  seethe	   IMF	  Global	  
Financial	   Stability	   Report	   (January	   2011)	   and	   the	   Report	   of	   the	   Financial	   Stability	   Board	   to	   G20	   Finance	  
Ministers	  and	  Central	  Bank	  Governors	  (November	  2011).	  
3 On	  these	  issues,	  see	  also	  the	  contributions	  in	  Silbey	  (2011).	  
4 For	  an	  analysis	  of	  cross-­‐sectoral	  differences	  in	  financial	  regulation,	  see	  also	  Simmons	  (2001).	  
5 Posner	  (2009)	  concedes	  that	  the	  timing	  and	  pattern	  of	  change	  in	  the	  six	  case	  studies	  he	  analyzes	  are	  highly	  
dependent	  on	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	   respective	   subsectors.	  Nevertheless,	   he	   falls	   short	   of	   investigating	  
these	   endogenous	   factors	   by	   concentrating	   on	   the	   impact	   of	   ’policy	   centralization’	   in	   the	   EU	   as	   the	  main	  
causal	  factor	  in	  patterns	  of	  transatlantic	  regulation.	  	  
6 For	  a	  nuanced	  analysis	  of	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  reform	  in	  the	  hedge	  fund	  sector,	  see	  Woll	  (2011)	  who	  accounts	  for	  
the	   type	   of	   reforms	   underway	   in	   a	   framework	   that	   links	   private	   subsector	   interests	   with	   state	   regulatory	  
preferences.	  
7 Note	  that	  in	  early	  scholarly	  writings	  on	  the	  crisis,	  this	  assessment	  was	  more	  widely	  shared,	  based	  in	  large	  part	  
to	  the	  emerging	  reform	  agenda	  and	  expectations	  of	  legislative	  activity.	  For	  a	  more	  sober	  view,	  see	  Froud	  et	  al	  
(2012).	  
8 For	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  different	  stages	  of	  global	  regulatory	  decision-­‐making	  see	  Abbott	  and	  Snidal	  (2009).	  
9 Mahoney	  and	  Thelen	  (2010,	  p.	  31)	  advance	  a	  similar	  point	  when	  they	  argue	  that	   ‘the	   interactions	  between	  
features	   of	   the	   political	   context	   and	   properties	   of	   the	   institutions	   themselves	   [are]	   critically	   important	   in	  
explaining	   institutional	  change’	  and	   	   that	   the	  type	  of	  change	  actors	  and	  the	  different	  strategies	   they	  adopt	  
are	  likely	  to	  differ	  in	  specific	  institutional	  settings.	  
10 This	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   the	   case	   if	   the	   few,	   leading	   states	   in	   question	   have	   conflicting	   preferences.	   Otherwise,	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